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POLITICAL CULTURE AND STATE BEHAVIOR:
WHY GERMANY CONFOUNDS NEOREALISM

Abstract

During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches
to account for the foreign and security policies of states. Surprisingly, however, these scholars
have devoted little attention to the concept that boasts the most venerable tradition in the field of
political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state behavior. This neglect is
unjustified. Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to explain phenomena that
are enigmatic from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such as neorealism. Yet it
applies to a broader range of cases than do the many alternative cultural concepts, such as
strategic culture and organizational culture, that have been employed. The paper begins by
describing an important puzzle in the international relations literature that suggests the need to
consider culture as a variable: the failure of neorealist predictions about German security policy
after unification. It then assesses the various cultural approaches to explaining state behavior
that have been advanced in recent years. After noting their similarities, the paper discusses the
important differences that mark them and identifies the reasons for the greater utility of political
culture. The final section of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of the political culture
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy since 1990.

Political Culture and State Behavior:
Why Germany Confounds Neorealism

Introduction

In July 1994, the German constitutional court resolved a longstanding controversy when
it ruled that the German armed forces could, in principle, participate in the full range of
collective military actions that might be mounted under U.N. auspices. In December of that
year, however, Germany balked when requested by NATO to provide a small number of combat
aircraft to help enforce the U.N.-authorized flight ban over Bosnia. To many observers at the
time, this inaction seemed inconsistent with Germany’s increased relative power status and its
heightened responsibility for ensuring peace in Europe following unification and the end of the
cold war. How then can it best be explained?
During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches
to account for the foreign and security policies of states. This trend can be attributed in large
part to dissatisfaction with neorealism and, more generally, the rationalist approaches that had
assumed prominence in the 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, a focus on culture promised to
account for consequential variations in state preferences, which neorealism and rational models
had typically assumed and often treated as homogenous across states.1
As a result of this interest in culture, the literature has witnessed a proliferation of
specific cultural concepts. Today, it is not uncommon to see references to strategic culture,
organizational culture, global or world culture, and political-military culture as well as a number
of kindred concepts that go by other names. Surprisingly, however, international relations
scholars have devoted little attention to the cultural concept that boasts the most venerable
tradition in the field of political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state

1

Legro 1996.

behavior.2
This neglect is unjustified. Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to
explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such
as neorealism. Yet it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases than do the alternative cultural
concepts that have been employed.
Accordingly, this paper seeks to remedy the previous neglect of political culture in the
study of foreign and security policy. It first suggests the need to consider culture as a variable by
describing the failure of neorealist predictions about German security policy after unification.
The paper then assesses the various cultural approaches to explaining state behavior that have
been advanced in recent years. After noting their similarities, it discusses the important
differences that mark them and identifies the reasons for the greater utility of political culture in
comparison with alternative cultural concepts.
The final section of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of the political culture
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy after unification. After describing
the anti-militarist and multilateralist sentiments that have been characteristic of German political
culture, it shows how these widely-shared attitudes can account for the often otherwise puzzling
ways in which Germany has acted toward European security institutions, transformed its armed
forces, and responded to out-of-area crises and conflicts in the 1990s. A conclusion offers
suggestions for future research on the relationship between political culture and state behavior.

A Puzzle for Neorealist Theory: German Security Policy after Unification

Neorealist theory is one of the leading approaches to the study of international relations.
2

Throughout the paper, I will use the term "state behavior" as a short-hand expression for its

external aspects, especially foreign and national security policy.

Although neorealism is often described as a theory of international outcomes rather than of state
behavior,3 these two phenomena cannot in fact be so easily separated. Indeed, variants of
neorealism have frequently been invoked to explain the foreign and security policies of
individual states.4
As a theory of state behavior, neorealism emphasizes the causal influence of a state’s
external environment and its position within the international system, especially its relative
power. Consequently, it is not surprising that a number of neorealist theorists as well as many
other observers predicted that German foreign and security policy would change significantly as
a result of the end of the cold war and German unification.5 The dissolution of the Soviet bloc
and of the Soviet Union itself had swept away many of the external constraints that had strait
jacketed German policy during the postwar era, especially the military threat posed by the
Warsaw Pact and Germany’s consequent security dependence on its Western allies, resulting in
much greater freedom of action. At the same time, unification had augmented the Federal
3

See especially Waltz 1979, 67-72.
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Two leading examples are Posen 1984 and Walt 1987. See also M. Elman 1995 and C. Elman

1996.
5

I focus on the shortcomings of neorealism in motivating the consideration of cultural

approaches for the following reason. Although no one has performed a thorough neorealist
analysis of the question and, at this point, no one is likely to do so, Mearsheimer (1990), Layne
(1993), Waltz (1993), and others have made a number of inferences about future German
behavior on the basis of neorealist premises. In contrast, scholars have rarely attempted to apply
explicitly other theories to the subject, and those few attempts that have been made have
typically addressed only one aspect of German security policy or another (e.g., Anderson and
Goodman 1993, Crawford 1996, Lantis 1996). In any case, neorealism, more than most other
theoretical approaches, promises to account for the broad thrust of German behavior.

Republic's already substantial raw power resources6 and extended its frontiers eastward, thereby
further enhancing its opportunities for pursuing influence in Europe and beyond, while the
potential for instability in Eastern Europe and actual conflicts in the Balkans generated
considerable pressure on Germany to act to ensure its security.
In view of these greatly altered geopolitical circumstances, it was only logical for
neorealists to expect that a profound reorientation of German security policy would follow. For
example, Germany's existing alliance ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the Western European Union (WEU) could have weakened or even been allowed to lapse.7
Concomitantly, Germany could have lost interest in the continued stationing of foreign troops on
its soil and might even have actively pressed for their removal. Instead, Germany might well
have sought to establish new security relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and former Soviet republics, possibly seeking to draw them into a German-dominated sphere of
influence.8 And it might have intervened unilaterally in conflicts in the region, reflecting a more
general willingness to use military force as an instrument of policy.9 To this end, Germany
might have developed a significant conventional capability for power projection, and it could
even have tried to acquire nuclear weapons.10 Overall, German security policy might well have
been characterized by increased unilateralism and assertiveness as Germany once again sought to
6

In the short term, of course, Germany's economic strength may actually have decreased,

especially if one considers indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the
balance of payments. See Rittberger 1992.
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Indeed, Mearsheimer's analysis of Europe after the cold war (1990) is predicated on this

assumption. See also Waltz 1993, 76.
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O'Brien 1992/93, 9.
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Schwarz 1994, 89.
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On this last possibility, see Mearsheimer 1990, 36-38; Layne 1993, 37; and Waltz 1993, 66-67.

play the role of a traditional great power.
In contrast to such expectations, however, German state behavior has been marked by a
high degree of moderation and continuity with its record in the postwar era. Far from setting off
in adventurist new directions, Germany has exercised considerable restraint and circumspection
in its external relations since 1990, as discussed in greater detail below. Above all, it has
continued to stress cooperative approaches to security involving a high degree of reliance on
international institutions. Germany has assiduously sought to maintain its previous alliance ties
while creating and strengthening other European security frameworks that have promised to
foster cooperation and stability in the region. In addition, it has continued to emphasize the use
of non-military means wherever possible, if not exclusively, to achieve security. Germany has
been an outspoken advocate of arms control agreements of all types, and it has done more than
any other country to promote political and economic reform in the former communist states of
Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, its overall military capabilities have declined
considerably, and German officials have evinced no interest whatsoever in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. In short, notwithstanding initial fears to the contrary, Germany has acted with
little more assertiveness and independent-mindedness in the area of national security than it did
during the cold war. Indeed, its leaders have expressly forsaken a great power role.
To be sure, a few noteworthy departures have occurred in German security policy since
1990. Germany's altered international circumstances have necessitated some adjustments. Most
conspicuously, the Federal Republic has become increasingly involved in international peace
missions outside the NATO area. Nevertheless, most if not all of these changes have been highly
consistent with Germany's overall approach to security in the postwar era. Thus few if any
German actions have provided legitimate grounds for concern, and some developments, such as
reductions in the German armed forces, have had the effect of making Germany even less
threatening to its neighbors rather than more so.

Cultural Alternatives, But Which?

If neorealism is an inadequate guide, how then might one best account for German
security policy since 1990? More generally, how might one explain the many similarly puzzling
instances in which states have not altered their behavior, or have done so only with considerable
delay, in response to significant shifts in their relative power positions? Declining powers have
often been slow to reduce their international commitments and to accept a smaller world role, or
have even refused to do so until forced by events. Conversely, rising states have not infrequently
failed to expand their external involvements in step with increases in their relative national
power.
Perhaps needless to say, scholars have over the years elaborated numerous theoretical
alternatives to neorealism, involving variables at the system level, the unit level, or both. Of late,
however, students of foreign and security policy have frequently turned to the realm of culture in
the search for explanations to puzzles such as this and, as a result, a plethora of cultural variables
have been advanced. Most notable among these have been strategic, organizational, politicalmilitary, and world culture, while numerous kindred concepts, such as beliefs, ideology, norms,
and national character, have also been employed.11 These seemingly diverse approaches share a
11

Relevant works employing the more generic term culture include Chay 1990, Katzenstein

1996b, Kratochwil and Lapid 1996, and Hudson 1997. The concept of strategic culture has been
developed and applied in Snyder 1977, Booth 1979, Gray 1981 and 1986, Klein 1991, Zhang
1992, Kupchan 1994, and Johnston 1995a and 1995b. Leading expositions of organizational
culture have been Legro 1995 and 1996 and Kier 1997. The concept of political-military culture
has been used primarily in Berger 1993, 1996, 1997, and 1998. World or global cultural
approaches are discussed in Finnemore 1996b and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996. On

number of characteristics that collectively distinguish them from materialist theories such as
neorealism, and, as will be discussed below, they are especially well-suited for explaining
continuity in state behavior. At the same time, however, these approaches are characterized by
important differences concerning the unit of analysis, issue-area relevance, and ideational
breadth that have thus far gone unremarked. Because of these differences, some cultural
approaches, especially political culture, promise to apply to a broader range of cases than do
others in the study of state behavior.

What Cultural Approaches Have In Common

Defining Characteristics

Almost every recent application of the concept of culture defines the term differently.
Despite the absence of a definitional consensus, however, most of the cultural approaches put
forward by students of international relations have a number of features in common. Above all,
they treat culture primarily, if not exclusively, as an ideational phenomenon.12 Whether culture
is described in terms of assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, conceptual models, feelings,
ideas, images, knowledge, meanings, mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols,
values, world views, or some combination of these concepts, it refers to the recurring patterns of
mental activity, or the habits of thought, perception, and feeling, that are common to members of
a particular group.

norms, see Klotz 1995, Finnemore 1996a, Katzenstein 1996a, and Price 1997.
12

In the field of anthropology as well, where the concept first attained prominence, an ideational

conception of culture has been gaining ground in recent years. See Elgström 1994, 293, and
Archer 1996, xi.

As such, culture needs to be distinguished from at least two other types of phenomena.
One of these is behavior. To be sure, a number of conceptualizations of culture have included a
behavioral component.13 And such definitions are not inherently objectionable. Nevertheless,
they do limit the usefulness of culture for explaining state action, which is a primary objective of
the recent cultural literature. Consequently, cultural theorists frequently argue that culture
should be defined and measured independently of behavior.14
In addition, culture should be distinguished from formal institutions that exist external to
human actors. As Thomas Berger has noted, “Institutions and culture exist in an interdependent
relationship, each relying upon the other in an ongoing way.”15 Accordingly, some cultural
theorists have explored the ways in which culture can become institutionalized and the
consequences of such institutionalization for state behavior.16 While institutionalization may be
an important mechanism through which culture may work, however, to equate culture with
institutions risks overlooking the various ways in which the former, as an ideational
phenomenon, can exert a direct influence on state behavior. Moreover, cultural and institutional
imperatives need not always be harmonious but can in fact be at odds with one another.
Consequently, it is important to maintain the distinction for more than just analytical reasons.
Beyond their common ideational basis, conceptions of culture share three other important
characteristics. First, culture is viewed as a property of collectivities rather than simply of the
13

See, for example, Tucker 1987, Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane 1991, and the discussions of the

early strategic culture literature in Kupchan 1992, 28, and Johnston 1995a, 5-7.
14

See, for example, Kupchan 1992, 26, and Johnston 1995a, 19.
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Berger 1998, 11-12.

16

Kupchan 1992, esp. 93-95, and Katzenstein 1996a. See also Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20-

24, and Jepperson and Swidler 1994, 362-63. The latter describe institutions as “congealed”
culture.

individuals that constitute them. The term implies a focus on the beliefs, values, and feelings, to
use three of the most commonly employed descriptors, that are intersubjectively shared by most
if not all of the members of a social, political, or organizational unit. As such, “cultures are
generally not reducible to individuals,” in contrast to belief systems and other concepts based on
individual psychology.17
Second, cultures are in principle distinctive. The culture of a group is not likely to be
identical to that of others, and profound differences may exist from one collectivity to another.18
This characteristic may be of no concern when one simply seeks to explain state actions that are
inconsistent with material imperatives and constraints. But the potential distinctiveness of
culture may be important for understanding differences in behavior by states similarly situated
within the material structure of the international system.19
Third, cultures are relatively stable, especially in comparison with material conditions.
Most of the time, culture changes only very slowly, if at all, even in the presence of an evolving
material environment. Significant adjustments over short periods usually occur only as a result
of dramatic events or traumatic experiences, which are typically required to discredit thoroughly
core beliefs and values, and thus are infrequent. Consequently, cultures can be quite autonomous
from, rather than merely a subjective reflection of, external conditions, although the latter
ultimately place some constraints on the content of the former.20
Cultures are resistant to change for a number of reasons. First, the fact that they are
17

Legro 1995, 20. See also Elkins and Simeon 1979, 123, 129, and 134; Vertzberger 1990, 267;

Johnston 1995a, ix; Kier 1997, 28; and Berger 1998, 9.
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Pye 1968, 221, and Elkins and Simeon 1979, 130.
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See also Berger 1998, 9.

20

Lijphart 1980, 42; Eckstein 1988, 792; Risse-Kappen 1994, 209; Johnston 1995a, 258; Legro

1995, 22-25; and Berger 1996, 326.

widely shared means that alternative sets of ideas are relatively few and enjoy little support
within the collectivity, thus limiting the possibility that existing beliefs and values might be
readily replaced. Second, some elements, especially normative and emotional components, are
inherently difficult to disconfirm.21 Third, even potentially falsifiable empirical elements are
buffered by the psychological phenomenon of consistency seeking. Information that reinforces
existing images and beliefs is readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored,
rejected, or distorted in order to make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures.22
Fourth, evidence that irrefutably contradicts reigning world views is rare in international
relations.23 And to the degree that cultures become institutionalized, they will be even more
difficult to dislodge, making persistence yet more likely.

The Relationship between Culture and Behavior

To be useful for purposes of explanation, a cultural theory must also postulate causal
mechanisms through which culture has an impact on behavior.24 The specific explanatory
models that have been advanced by cultural theorists, however, are almost as numerous as the
definitions of culture that they have employed. Nevertheless, one can identify four general ways,
distinct from institutionalization, in which cultures can directly influence the collective behavior
of the groups that hold them. These pathways correspond to the tasks that are intrinsic to all but
21

See also Berger 1998, 15.
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Cognitive consistency is discussed in Jervis 1976, ch. 4; George 1980, 19-20, 56-57, and 61-

66; Nisbett and Ross 1980, ch. 8; and Shimko 1992, 28-32.
23

Larsen 1994, 25.

24

The importance of identifying causal mechanisms in causal explanations involving ideas is

stressed in Yee 1996, 83-84.

the simplest decision-making processes, whether or not these tasks are explicitly stated.25
First, culture helps to define the basic goals of the collectivity. From one perspective, a
group’s culture may be the seat of its social identity, which in turn generates its interests. Many
interests “depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity
of others.”26 Alternatively, one can think of the values embedded within a culture as establishing
a range of desirable ends that group action might be designed to achieve. Either way, culture
may do much to determine the general policy objectives that are to be pursued.27
Second, culture shapes perceptions of the external environment. On the one hand, it
conditions the range of issues to which attention is devoted by influencing what people notice.
The general effect is to focus attention selectively, causing some phenomena to be overlooked
while the importance of others is magnified. On the other hand, culture influences how those
features of the surrounding landscape and external events that do register upon people’s minds
are interpreted and understood. In other words, it defines the situation, including possible
challenges to one’s interests and opportunities to pursue them, in which action is to take place.28
Third, cultures shape the formulation and identification of the behaviors available for
25

Khong (1992, 10 and 20-22) has identified a very similar set of tasks. Two other instructive

discussions of the various ways in which beliefs can affect policy making are O. Holsti 1976, 3335, and George 1979, 101-104. It should be stressed that not every cultural theory posits each of
the following mechanisms, and some may include only one or two.
26

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 60.
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Verba 1965, 517; Klein 1991; Kupchan 1992, 6 and 27; Legro 1995, 21; Jepperson, Wendt, and

Katzenstein 1996, 60-62; and Kier 1997, 5, 21, and 38.
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Verba 1965, 513 and 516; Rockman 1976, 11; Elkins and Simeon 1979, 128 and 143; Rohrlich

1987, 66; Vertzberger 1990, 271; Legro 1995, 23; Legro 1996, 133, 122; Katzenstein 1996a, 19;
and Kier 1997, 28.

advancing or defending the group’s interests in a particular context. At a deep level, they delimit
the universe of possibilities for action. Cultures condition the types of options that are seen to
exist. As a result, some alternatives may not even be conceived of.29 In addition, cultures define
the instruments and tactics that are judged acceptable, appropriate, or legitimate within the
broader set of those that are imaginable, thereby placing further limits on the types of the policies
that can be proposed, defended, and pursued.30 In any case, certain options, perhaps even a large
number of them, are excluded from consideration.31
Fourth, culture can strongly influence the evaluation of the seemingly available options
and thus the choices that are made among them. On the one hand, it conditions understandings
of the likely outcomes of alternative courses of action. On the other hand, it shapes assessments
of the costs and benefits and thus the desirability of the various possible outcomes.32
The overall effect of cultures is to predispose collectivities toward certain actions and
policies rather than others. Some options will simply not be imagined. Of those that are
contemplated, some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate, ineffective, or
counterproductive than others. To be sure, culture is not deterministic. It may not and often
does not precisely determine behavior. But it can significantly narrow the range of actions likely
29

Elkins and Simeon 1979, 128; Kupchan 1994, 92 and 94; and Kier 1997, 28.

30

Elkins and Simeon 1979, 131; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 272; Kupchan 1995, 6,

27, and 90; and Katzenstein 1996a, 19. A closely related concept is that of national role
conceptions, which are policy makers' definitions of the actions that are suitable to their state and
the functions that their state should perform on a continuing basis. See K. Holsti 1970 and
Vertzberger 1990, 284-93.
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Elkins and Simeon 1979, 143; and Johnston 1995a, 35.
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Vertzberger 1990, 272; Johnston 1995a, 37; and Legro 1996, 133. See also George 1979, 101

and 103; George 1980, 45; and Goldstein 1993, 250.

to be adopted in any given set of circumstances.33
Going further, one may conclude that culture promotes continuity in behavior. Continuity
follows from the relative stability of culture. Even as external circumstances change, decision
makers may persist in defining problems in traditional ways, or they may continue to favor
familiar approaches in trying to address new concerns. Thus culture promises to be particularly
useful for explaining cases of puzzling or unexpected constancy in foreign and security policy.34

Criticisms of Cultural Approaches

Attempts to apply cultural concepts to political and other matters have been subjected to
heavy criticism over the years.35 This is no less true of the recent wave of cultural explanations
of foreign and security policy.36 Although many of these criticisms warrant attention as
descriptions of potential pitfalls to be avoided, few if any have revealed intrinsic flaws in the
concept of culture itself. Rather, they have primarily concerned the problematic ways in which it
has often been applied, especially in studies of culture as a determinant of domestic political
structures and stability.37
One early criticism of the concept of political culture addressed the excessively sweeping
and uncritical manner in which it was sometimes employed to account for patterns of behavior in
diverse societies. Consequently, cultural approaches to the study of politics, like the work on
33

Rockman 1976, 1-4; Elkins and Simeon 1979, 133 and 139; Eckstein 1988, 790; Vertzberger

1990, 267; Johnston 1995a, 35; and Johnston 1995b, 42-45.
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Desch 1998.
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Pateman 1971, Rogowski 1974, and Barry 1978.

national character that had preceded them, were accused of ethnocentrism.38 In addition, some
of the earliest work on the concept was criticized as unduly impressionistic and speculative,
being based on intuition, reading, and conversation rather than on hard, replicable facts.39
These early criticisms were addressed through the increased use of more systematic
techniques such as sample surveys, quantitative content analysis, and structured interviews.
These new methods in turn raised questions about their ability to capture and measure such an
inherently subjective and potentially multi-dimensional phenomenon as culture, especially in the
context of cross-national comparisons.40 In response, a number of scholars advocated the use of
more interpretive methods even while taking steps to ensure that their sources were truly
reflective of the cultures under investigation.41
Three other commonly voiced criticisms are that culture is merely a residual category to
which scholars turn whenever explanations based on more concrete factors fail;42 that cultural
explanations are rendered tautological through the derivation of inferences about culture from
behavior;43 and that the use of the term culture may obscure fundamental differences and
conflicts among the views held by members of the same group.44 Once again, however, these
38

Inkeles 1997.

39

Almond and Verba 1963.

40

Pye 1973, 71; Verba 1980, 402-405; and Welch 1993, 43.
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Rockman 1976; Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman 1978, 8; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman

1981, 33-35; Laitin 1988, 591-93; and Pye 1991, 500-502.
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Pye 1973, 67; Pye 1991, 504; and Kupchan 1992, 26.
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1963, 50; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981, 30-31; Kupchan 1992, 26-27; and Berger
1996, 328.
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Dirks, Eley, and Ortner 1992, 3, and Brightman 1995, 515-18.

criticisms flow not from inherent limitations in the concept of culture but from the manner in
which it has been applied. Scholars need not wait to employ cultural variables until all the other
possibilities have been exhausted, although the spectacular failure of leading alternatives often
provides a compelling motive for turning to culture. Likewise, as suggested above, the danger of
tautology can be greatly reduced simply be removing behavior from the definition of culture.
And charges of exaggerated cultural homogeneity can be addressed by disaggregating where
appropriate the unit in question into relevant subgroups possessing coherent cultures of their
own.
Perhaps the most frequent and serious criticism concerns the difficulty of defining,
operationalizing, and measuring cultural variables.45 Definitions of political culture in particular
have been criticized for being fuzzy and lacking in clarity. The danger of such ambiguity, of
course, is that a wide range of behavior may be construed as consistent with a particular culture.
As a result, cultural explanations may be difficult to test and disconfirm.46 It is not clear,
however, whether this difficulty is necessarily any more characteristic of culture than it is of
other commonly used concepts, such as power.47 And as a recent critic of cultural approaches
ultimately concedes, “[t]he definitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather
than principle, because it is possible to clearly define and operationalize culture.”48

Choosing Among Cultural Approaches: Why Political Culture Is Likely to Be Most Useful

The biggest challenge facing those who would employ cultural variables to explain state
45

Kupchan 1992, 26; Rosen 1995, 13-14; and Desch 1998, 150-52.
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Pye 1973, 67-68; Rogowski 1973, 13; and Inkeles 1997, viii.
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behavior, then, may not be that of defending culture against its critics but that of choosing from
among the many cultural approaches available. In this section, I argue that political culture is
likely to apply to a broader range of cases and thus represents a more useful starting point in the
analysis of foreign and security policy than do other cultural concepts. The term political culture
has been used to denote the subjective orientations toward and assumptions about the political
world that characterize the members of a particular society and that guide and inform their
political behavior. Scholars have distinguished three basic components of political culture: the
cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values,
norms, and moral judgments; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional
attachments, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference. 49
In order to establish the advantages of beginning with a focus on political culture in the
study of state behavior, it is helpful to recognize that cultural concepts may differ in at least three
respects. One is the nature of the culture-bearing unit. Another is the breadth of the issue-areas
to which a particular concept applies. And a third is the comprehensiveness of the concept’s
ideational content, that is, the range of beliefs, values, and feelings that it embraces. Only when
political culture is evaluated against alternative cultural approaches using these distinctions does
its greater applicability become clear.

Units of Analysis

Existing cultural theories encompass a wide range of culture-bearing units. At one
extreme are global and world cultural approaches in which the relevant unit of analysis is global
49

Particularly useful discussions of political culture, from which this definition has been distilled,

are Almond and Verba 1963 and 1980, Pye 1965, Verba 1965, Putnam 1973, Rockman 1976,
Elkins and Simeon 1979, and Eckstein 1988.

society. These approaches promise to be especially useful for explaining common patterns and
trends in state behavior (as well as state structures), since global culture can be hypothesized as
having a homogenizing effect.50 Their principal limitation is that they are unable to account for
variations across states, which are, perhaps needless to say, quite common and often at the center
of comparative studies of state behavior.
At the other end of the spectrum are approaches that emphasize the cultures of small
groups and other units within states.51 The most frequently employed of these in studies of
foreign and security policy is organizational culture. As these studies have shown,
organizational culture can have an important influence on certain policies and actions. As a
general rule, however, this approach promises to be useful for explaining external state behavior
in only a very limited set of circumstances.52
In the first place, few governmental organizations may possess a well-defined culture that
clearly sets them apart them from other elements of the bureaucracy or even the society at large.
The empirical work on the subject to date has focused on military organizations, which by their
highly regimented and often isolated natures are those bureaucracies most likely to be
characterized by distinct cultures.
Second, only rarely will a single organization be in a position to exert decisive influence
over national policy making. More likely, its preferences will be but one of a variety of inputs
into the policy process. A specific organizational culture, moreover, will typically be of
relevance to only certain aspects of foreign and security policy, primarily those in the
formulation or execution of which the organization concerned plays a formal role. In fact,
previous applications of the concept to issues such as military doctrine and wartime decisions
50
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about the use of particular weapons constitute most likely cases for the influence of
organizational culture, given that the interests of the military were heavily involved, the military
had a near monopoly on expertise, and little time was available for decision making.53
Much more often than not, the impact of organizational culture will be highly mediated
by other unit-level factors such as the structure of the decision making process, the domestic
distribution of power, and the broader political culture of society.54 Thus even where
organizational cultures exist, it is necessary in most cases to integrate them into more complex
models that include additional domestic-level variables in order to explain state behavior. This
need is only reinforced by the observation that recent studies of organizational culture have
actually focused on the subunits of military organizations, thereby further compounding the
problem of aggregating unit preferences.55
Accordingly, the most promising place to begin the search for cultural sources of state
behavior, especially its broad patterns and trends, is at the level of the society represented by the
state. Arguably, foreign and security policy, more than other issue-areas, “involve shared
national beliefs and values rather than particularistic interests.”56 Even this more restrictive
focus, however, leaves several competing conceptual candidates from which to choose, including
53
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national character, political culture, political-military culture, and strategic culture.

Issue-areas and Ideational Content

In order to narrow the field yet further, therefore, it is necessary to consider the range of
issues to which each approach applies and the comprehensiveness of its ideational content.
When this is done, one finds that the remaining alternatives to the political culture approach are
either too broad or unduly confining. On the one hand, national character, which is the most
general of the cultural concepts at the societal level, is excessively expansive. National character
has been defined as “any internal psychological qualities of a nation which are relatively
enduring and which may serve to distinguish that nation from others.”57 As such, it includes
many elements that are of little or no relevance to political life. In addition, as Lucian Pye has
pointed out, the national character approach has failed “to recognize that the political sphere
constitutes a distinct subculture with its own rules of conduct and its distinct processes of
socialization.”58 Not surprisingly, it has found little application within the field of political
science.
Other societal-level cultural concepts, on the other hand, are unduly narrow in scope and
applicability. Although it does not use the term culture, a kindred approach is to be found in the
burgeoning democratic peace literature, especially the strand that emphasizes the impact of
liberal values, norms, and ideologies on state behavior.59 This approach has proven useful for
explaining why liberal democracies do not fight one another. It is far too limited in the range of
variables that it considers, however, to serve as a more general theory of state behavior. Indeed,
it cannot even account for the many ways in which the foreign and security policies of liberal
57
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democracies may differ from one another.
The concepts most closely related to political culture are those of strategic culture and
political-military culture.60

These concepts have considerable applicability, and of the many

cultural approaches, that of strategic culture has perhaps been the most frequently employed in
the study of foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, even these alternatives lack the utility of
political culture, for two main reasons. First, they have usually been defined in such a way as to
preclude their application to the full range of aspects of state behavior that may be of interest.
The original definitions of strategic culture concerned military strategy, especially nuclear
strategy, and the use of force.61 Although Iain Johnston has advanced a more general conception
that relates to a state’s grand strategy, other recent applications have continued to employ much
narrower interpretations.62 Of perhaps somewhat broader applicability is the concept of
political-military culture. Yet it, too, might be inadequate for understanding important elements
of foreign policy, given its explicit focus on matters of defense, security, and the military. 63
A second reason is the limited ideational content of strategic culture. Recent definitions
of the concept have typically been confined to the cognitive aspects of culture, omitting the
normative and affective components that can also have a significant influence on state behavior.
For Johnston, the central paradigm of a strategic culture “consists of basic assumptions about the
orderliness of the strategic environment,” which he also describes as a “system of symbols.”64
Charles Kupchan restricts the term to refer only to the images and symbols that shape how a

60

Berger 1993, 1996, 1997, and 1998.

61

E.g., Snyder 1977 and Gray 1981.

62

Klein 1991, Kupchan 1994, and Johnston 1995a and 1995b.

63

Berger 1998, 15.

64

Johnston 1995a, 37.

polity conceives of the relationship between empire and national security.65 Such definitions
unnecessarily truncate the range of potential causal mechanisms through which strategic culture
can exert influence.

Conditions Under Which the Political Culture Approach Is Likely to Apply

In sum, political culture is the most promising starting point for the cultural analysis of
state behavior. It subsumes most alternative societal-level cultural constructs, such as strategic
culture and political-military culture, while remaining focused on political phenomena, in
contrast to national character.66 Political culture is likely to have the greatest impact on policy
under two conditions. First, its influence will be particular strong when the international setting
is characterized by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. In such
circumstances, the problems a state faces are less clear, and the objective costs and benefits of
different courses of action are less obvious.67 As a result, decision makers can or must more
readily fall back on their pre-existing world views and notions of the consequences of alternative
policies.
Political culture will also figure more importantly as an explanation when national policy
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is not the exclusive province of only one person or a very small number of decision makers.68
This condition is more closely approximated in representative democracies than in dictatorships
or oligarchies. It is also more likely to obtain if one considers broad patterns and trends in policy
rather than specific actions decided hastily and under conditions of high secrecy, such as in
wartime.
Despite its potential usefulness, however, political culture is not likely to be an
explanatory panacea, even when these two conditions are met. Its ability to account for state
behavior may still be highly limited in some circumstances. One reason is that political culture
may be vague or incomplete. Consequently, it may offer little or no guidance on certain issues
or aspects of policy,69 In addition, political culture may be internally inconsistent. As a result, it
may offer conflicting diagnoses and prescriptions and thus push policy simultaneously in
different directions.70
Finally, the concept may be of little use if there is no single dominant political culture
within a given state. In some cases, societies are divided into groups with competing political
subcultures.71 Thus policy may vary significantly depending on which group controls the
relevant positions of state authority. Alternatively, most of the members of a society may share a
wide range of beliefs and values but will hold differing attitudes on an important subset of issues.
Either way, it may be necessary to identify the relevant cleavages and to consider the policy
process in order to achieve a satisfactory account of state behavior.
68
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Where a single political culture can be said to exist, and especially where it is detailed,
comprehensive, and internally consistent, however, it may exert a strong influence over and thus
offer a parsimonious explanation of important aspects of foreign and security policy. Even if
there is no comprehensive political culture, moreover, those aspects of relevance to external state
behavior may be homogeneous. And even where attitudinal differences go further, political
culture may nevertheless place distinct limits on the range of state actions that can be imagined
and legitimately discussed. In any case, whether or not a single political culture exists in a given
society must be determined empirically and should not simply be assumed.

Political Culture and German Security Policy after Unification

The remainder of the paper seeks to illustrate the usefulness of the political culture
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy after unification. Two general
tasks must be accomplished. The first is to determine whether Germans indeed share a distinct
political culture that is of potential relevance to national security policy and, if so, to specify
what that culture is. The second task is to ascertain whether such a political culture has plausibly
had a notable impact on German security policy since 1990.
Specifying a country’s political culture requires in turn that the investigator answer three
questions. How should political culture be dimensionalized into one or more discrete elements
that can be represented as operationalizable variables?72 Where should one look for evidence of
the existence and content of a political culture? And how should the values of the components of
political culture that are of interest be established? This analysis seeks to locate German political
culture on two particularly important dimensions along which attitudes regarding the
effectiveness and appropriateness of alternative policies can vary: militarism--anti-militarism and
unilateralism--multilateralism. It pays particular, although not exclusive, attention to the relevant
beliefs and values of German political and administrative elites. And it draws inferences about
these elite attitudes from a wide variety of sources, including official documents, public
statements, press reports, independent analyses, and confidential interviews. As for the second
task, that of discerning the behavioral impact of political culture, the paper places primary
emphasis on what Alexander George has termed the "congruence" procedure, which involves
looking for a logical correspondence between the dependent and independent variables. These
methodological choices are explained in the Appendix.
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German Political Culture in the 1990s

Following this approach, I have found that German society as a whole, and German
political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely-shared, and
rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to foreign and national
security policy.73 These attitudes were shaped primarily by two sets of historical experiences.
The first was the traumatic and ultimately disastrous experience of the Nazi dictatorship and
World War II. These events discredited much of Germany's previous political culture and
increased German receptiveness to alternative beliefs and values. Also important was the
generally successful and thus positive foreign policy experience of the postwar years, including
the German experience with international institutions, which reinforced the newly dominant
political orientation that was emerging.74
Some observers have wondered whether the end of the cold war and the sudden
incorporation of 16 million former East Germans into the Federal Republic might significantly
alter or fragment German political culture. Certainly, eastern and western German public
opinion on a variety of core security issues has been marked by notable differences, especially in
the first years after unification.75 The significance of these differences should not be
exaggerated, however. Former East Germans constitute only 20 percent of the population of
united Germany, and their actual influence on security policy has been and is likely to remain
disproportionately smaller, at least in the medium term. For the time being, moreover, eastern
Germans have shown relatively little interest in matters of foreign policy and national security,
73
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since, on the whole, they have been "more concerned with everyday issues."76 Thus unification
has had and is likely to have little impact on those aspects of German political culture that are of
relevance to external state behavior.77 To the contrary, the peaceful end to the division of
Germany may have affirmed and reinforced them by seemingly vindicating and rewarding
postwar policy principles and practices.

Anti-militarism

Where then does German political culture fall along the dimensions of militarism--antimilitarism and unilateralism--multilateralism? One of the most striking aspects of German
political culture concerns the military and the use force. Since World War II, anti-militarism and
even pacifism have acquired strong roots in Germany.78 Well before unification took place, most
Germans exhibited a "reluctance or, depending on the political camp, an open refusal to consider
military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy."79 Indeed, a not insignificant
number of Germans have been inclined to consider peace an absolute value, rejecting the use of
force even to safeguard or restore other political goals such as justice or international law.80
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These normative views have been reinforced by shared beliefs about the disutility of force.
Many Germans have tended to see only the disadvantages and inefficacy of military action,
viewing it as risky and even counterproductive, especially in the absence of a political strategy
for achieving a lasting solution to the situation at hand.81 Although such sentiments moderated
somewhat in the 1990s in light of the qualified successes achieved by multilateral military
interventions intended to contain and prevent ethnic conflict, especially in the Balkans, Germans
continued to regard the direct application of force as a very last resort, one to be employed only
in the most compelling circumstances, such as a looming humanitarian catastrophe, and when all
other means had proved inadequate.82
Consequently, it long ago became conventional wisdom that the functions of the German
armed forces, the Bundeswehr, should be limited almost exclusively to national self-defense and
that Germany should never again develop a significant power projection capability.83 This
highly restrictive view of Germany's military role, sometimes characterized as an "obliviousness
to power,"84 has been little modified since unification, the principal departure being a new
willingness to contribute forces to international peace missions as long as doing so involves little
or no risk of combat. Instead, "Germany maintains a strong preference for economic, political,
and diplomatic instruments, arms control, and dispute settlement as the preferred means of
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security policy."85 Not surprisingly, non-military instruments have been widely seen as more
effective than the use of force, a view that may even have been reinforced by the experience of
unification.86
Closely related to these attitudes toward the use of force have been deep-seated fears of
the potentially pernicious domestic effects of militarism and a consequent distrust of military
institutions. Many Germans have continued to be concerned about a possible renewal of military
domination of national security decision making, as occurred during the time of the Prussian
General Staff. Likewise, they have been wary of the emergence of a professional army that
could once again become "a state within the state" that was largely unaccountable to political
authorities, as took place during the interwar years.87 Consequently, most Germans have felt that
as long as the Federal Republic must maintain armed forces, they must be integrated into
German society to the greatest possible extent.88

Multilateralism

Another important set of widely-shared norms that are rooted in Germany's recent past
help to locate German political culture along the dimension of unilateralism--multilateralism.
Here, a leading imperative has been to avoid acting alone (Alleingänge) or pursuing a special
path (Sonderweg). Germans have exhibited a strong distaste for, even an abhorrence of,
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unilateralism. Such sentiments have been expressed by virtually all German political leaders.89
This norm as well has been reinforced by commonly held cause-effect beliefs. German leaders
have feared the consequences of unilateralism, believing that it can only lead to diplomatic
isolation, insecurity, and conflict.90
The previous German penchant for nationalism and unilateralism has been supplanted by
a degree of support for international cooperation and even integration, involving the sacrifice of
national prerogatives, that is unparalleled.91 German leaders have greatly preferred pursuing
Germany's national interests in close cooperation with other countries over acting alone.92 To be
sure, multilateralism and integration have also been viewed as serving concrete Germany
objectives.93 They are useful for reassuring Germany's neighbors, and they are essential for
avoiding diplomatic isolation and future conflicts. Indeed, they may be the only way to address
some foreign and security policy concerns.94 But multilateralism has not been embraced only for
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instrumental purposes. For many German leaders, it has become a leading goal in and of itself.95
A direct corollary of German multilateralism is the importance German political elites
have attached to international institutions. German leaders have constantly emphasized the need
for Germany to work through and to be anchored firmly within the structures of international
cooperation, be they transatlantic, West European, pan-European, or global.96 At the same time,
they have been strongly inclined to abide by the rules that these institutions often embody. This
approach, which served Germany so well during the postwar era, has been viewed as being of
continued relevance to German policy for the indefinite future.97
Also related to the German commitment to multilateralism and international institutions
has been the tremendous importance that German leaders have attached to Berechenbarkeit, or
calculability, in foreign policy.98 They have been anxious for their country to be perceived as a
reliable, predictable, dependable partner, a concern that they frequently and openly articulate. 99
This imperative "has created a presumption against any government reneging upon, let alone
renouncing, the basic substance of established foreign-policy commitments."100 Not to fulfill
Germany's international obligations and responsibilities would undermine the country's
credibility in the eyes of its partners. Thus stability and continuity in German security policy
have become leading normative guidelines in their own right.
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The widely shared nature of these norms and beliefs has had important potential
implications for German state behavior. In particular, it has formed the basis for a high degree of
consensus since unification on many basic issues of national security policy. Few if any
discernible differences have existed among the ministries and offices of the federal government
with responsibilities in this area, including the German military, a situation that suggests the
inapplicability of the organizational culture approach.101 More importantly, this consensus has
been shared by elites located across most of the political spectrum. Thus prior to the federal
elections of 1994 and 1998, leaders of the opposition of Social Democratic Party (SPD)
expressed satisfaction with the fundamental orientation of the government’s policy, helping to
ensure that national security was perhaps the least disputed issue in either campaign.102

The Impact of German Political Culture on German Security Policy

What impact has German political culture in fact had on German state behavior since
1990? This section examines the influence of political culture on three main areas of Germany’s
security policy after unification: its policy toward Europe's security institutions, the
101
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transformation of the Bundeswehr, and German responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts.103 I
show that, whereas many German actions appear problematic when viewed through a neorealist
lens, they are highly consistent with the content of German political culture.104

German Policy toward European Security Institutions

One area in which German political culture appears to have had a noteworthy impact has
been German policy toward the various institutions of European security. Since unification and
the end of the cold war, Germany has continued to devise and execute its security policy almost
entirely in cooperation with others and within the context of international institutions. Indeed,
Germany, more than most other European countries, has vigorously sought to maintain,
strengthen, and adapt wherever possible the regional security institutions that arose during the
cold war -- and, in some cases, to develop new ones.105
Above all, Germany's commitment to NATO, which many doubted at the time of
unification, has not wavered. Rather, German leaders from across the political spectrum have
repeatedly expressed their support for the alliance and the continued presence of allied forces on
German soil.106 German forces have remained firmly integrated into the alliance's military
103
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planning and command structure.107 And Germany has been a leading participant in the process
of adapting NATO to the new European security environment, which has included furthering the
degree of military integration in the alliance.108
At the same time, Germany has been at the forefront of recent efforts to create a West
European security and defense identity (ESDI). Jointly with France, it proposed that the
European Community develop a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), provisions for
which were included in the Treaty on European Union approved at Maastricht in late 1991.109
Since unification, moreover, it has worked to increase the mandate and operational capacities of
the WEU and to bring that body within the framework of the European Union where it could
implement defense-related aspects of the CFSP.110 And in 1992, Germany and France elaborated
plans to expand the existing Franco-German brigade into an integrated "Eurocorps," which other
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WEU members were invited to join.111 These efforts to give the ESDI a stronger profile
continued unabated through the 1990s.112
Finally, German policy has emphasized involving the reform states of Central and
Eastern Europe in broader institutional security frameworks that include Germany's Western
allies rather than establishing new bilateral security ties with the former. Germany has been a
principal architect of the many initiatives intended to strengthen the pan-European Conference
on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe.113 It was Germany, along with
the United States, that proposed in 1991 the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) that would include the former Warsaw Pact states.114 Subsequently, German leaders
have worked to strengthen further NATO and WEU links with their country's eastern neighbors
and have advocated that these bodies be open to new members, although they have been quick to
caution that enlargement should not be allowed to weaken the alliances or strain unduly relations
with Russia.115
Germany's strong support for European security institutions after unification is clearly
difficult to reconcile with the tenets of neorealism. In particular, it clashes with the common
111
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neorealist assumption that states will seek to maximize their autonomy and avoid external ties
wherever possible, especially in view of the Federal Republic's much greater potential freedom
of action following the end of the cold war. Even if neorealism could explain Germany’s
continued involvement in one body or another, it would have great difficulty accounting for the
fact that Germany has championed so many different institutional forms simultaneously. This
across-the-board approach has sometimes been dysfunctional, as when it has provoked sharp
criticism by Germany's partners.116 German behavior in this regard also stands in contrast to the
policies of the other major West European states, which have been much more selective in their
support for the various alternative security arrangements.117
Instead, this record is much less problematic when viewed in the context of Germany's
distinct political culture, especially the pronounced aversion to unilateralism, the equally strong
instinctive preference for international cooperation and multilateralism, and the desire to be
perceived as a reliable partner that most Germans have shared. These deeply-held attitudes have
inclined German leaders to place considerable intrinsic value on European security institutions
independently of any careful cost-benefit calculations. They help to explain why German
officials have seen no inherent contradictions in promoting all of the major regional bodies
simultaneously and thus why they have underestimated the possible conflicts in such an
approach. Instead, the importance of creating, maintaining, and strengthening such institutions
wherever the opportunity to do so exists has been virtually an article of faith among the German
political elite.118
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The Transformation of the Bundeswehr

A second area in which German political culture has arguably had a noticeable impact
has been in the German armed forces. Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has been profoundly
transformed. Not only have the armed forces been reduced in size by nearly one-third from their
cold war maximum -- and by as much as one-half if those of the former German Democratic
Republic are included -- but they have been fundamentally restructured. Whereas, during the
cold war, virtually all regular Bundeswehr units were maintained at a high level of readiness, the
majority are now heavily dependent upon mobilization.119 These developments can be
understood largely as a logical consequence, from a neorealist perspective, of Germany's altered
strategic circumstances, especially the sharp decline in the immediate military threat.
Despite the magnitude of these changes, however, the Bundeswehr has failed to adapt
optimally to the new strategic environment in at least two respects. First, the German
government has made only limited progress toward the development of new national capabilities
for exercising operational control of the German armed forces in situations, chiefly UN missions
beyond NATO territory, in which they would have to operate outside of the alliance structures on
which the Federal Republic has traditionally relied.120 Second, the government has steadfastly
refused to abandon male conscription (Wehrpflicht) despite its increasing dysfunctionality. As a
result of the end of the cold war, both the the military usefulness and the political legitimacy of
conscription have been regularly called into question, and not only in Germany. Even France,
119
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which invented the modern levée en masse, decided in 1996 to follow the lead of alliance
partners such as Belgium and the Netherlands in moving to create a professional army, leaving
Germany alone among the major Western powers as a practitioner of compulsory military
service.121
Although troublesome from a neorealist perspective, both of these examples of
maladjustment can be readily understood in terms of Germany's postwar political culture,
especially the strong strand of anti-militarism that it contains.122 On the one hand, antimilitarism has lain at the root of widespread popular and, to a lesser extent, elite concerns about
the possible reconstitution of a German General Staff that might be unaccountable to German
political authorities.123 Consequently, the government has been forced to proceed with caution in
its efforts to enhance Germany's planning and command capabilities, even though such
improvements have been necessitated in large part by Germany's multilateral commitments.124
On the other hand, anti-militarism has fostered, somewhat paradoxically, a strong, if not
universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the postcold war era. Compulsory military service, elites from across the political spectrum have
believed, remains an indispensable link between the Bundeswehr and the German people,125 even
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though an increasing number of commentators have observed that Germany had nothing to fear
from a professional army.126 These attitudes have ensured that conscription would be preserved
in Germany, even as its neighbors moved to abandon the draft.

German Responses to Out-of-Area Crises and Conflicts

A third major area of German security policy in which German political culture appears
to have exerted considerable influence has been the country's responses to out-of-area crises and
conflicts since unification. During the cold war, the German armed forces had one overriding
military mission: to deter and, if necessary, to defend against a potentially large-scale, Soviet-led
Warsaw Pact attack on Germany launched with little or no warning.127 Almost all military
planning and resources were devoted to this primary contingency. Virtually no thought was
given to using the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO area or even to defending NATO allies
other than Germany's immediate neighbors.128
Since 1990, however, Germany has been confronted with a series of international crises
and conflicts that have demanded a German response. Not only have some of these, especially
the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, threatened to affect Germany directly, but the country has
repeatedly come under pressure from the United Nations and its allies to contribute to a wide
variety of international actions outside the NATO area intended to keep or restore the peace.
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Unlike during the cold war, Germany has no longer been granted the option of remaining aloof
from such out-of-area operations in order to concentrate on the defense of its own territory.
Nevertheless, Germany's response to these challenges has been decidedly equivocal. On
the one hand, an important shift in German security policy has taken place. Since 1991,
Germany has gradually expanded the nature and scope of its involvement in international
military operations intended to preserve or restore peace. Bundeswehr units have been
dispatched to locations as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, and the Balkans.
Perhaps most striking is the contrast between the tentativeness with which Germany joined the
forces monitoring the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and its unhesitating
assumption of an equal role in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia four years later.
Largely as a result of these actions, a number of observers have spoken of a "normalization" of
German foreign and security policy.129
On the other hand, Germany's assumption of a growing international military role has
been consistently marked by substantial reservations and numerous limitations. Germany has
not always offered to make a military contribution to international peace missions, and at other
times, it has done so only after considerable debate and with great ambivalence. Moreover,
where German forces have deployed outside the NATO area, they have done so only in relatively
small numbers, and they have been restricted almost exclusively to roles that have involved no
risk of combat.130
One cause of this mixed record, at least for the first four years after unification, was the
prevailing interpretation of the German Basic Law, which was widely viewed as permitting the
armed forces to be used, apart from humanitarian missions, only for the defense of Germany
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itself and its allies.131 Consequently, even those political leaders who favored making a more
substantial military contribution to international peace missions were obliged to limit their
advocacy to actions that were not clearly inconsistent with these highly constraining guidelines.
The German government sought to cloak most proposed deployments in the guise of
humanitarian assistance, and Bundeswehr missions clearly at odds with the restrictive
constitutional interpretation were assiduously avoided.
Nevertheless, even the more active responses that government officials would have
preferred to make were typically less forceful and less substantial than Germany's partners would
have wished. And even the lifting of the alleged constitutional restraints in July 1994 failed to
produce any profound reorientation of German policy. To the contrary, it has remained
circumscribed by clear criteria that are unusual for a country of Germany's size and overall
importance in world affairs and that, in any case, have virtually ensured that German
involvement in military operations beyond national and alliance defense would indeed be
infrequent. In fact, German leaders have stressed that their country's contributions to
international efforts to promote peace would continue to be primarily of a political and economic
nature.132 Thus when confronted with a series of allied requests in late 1994 and 1995 to
contribute forces to the international efforts to bring peace to Bosnia, Germany responded with
some hesitation and imposed numerous conditions on its involvement.133 And even the much
less qualified nature of the Federal Republic’s contribution to the NATO Stabilization Force
(SFOR) in Bosnia since the end of 1996, which for the first time allowed the Bundeswehr to
participate as an equal partner, can be attributed far more to the modesty of its size, the low level
131
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of risk involved, and its primarily non-combat purposes than to any fundamental change of
attitude.
Instead, the pattern of German responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts can be fully
understood only if one considers German political culture. On the one hand, the "culture of
reticence" has inclined many German political leaders to proceed slowly and cautiously,
especially on such a controversial and potentially explosive issue.134 At the same time, as a
result of the anti-militarist attitudes that have taken root in Germany since World War II, German
leaders from across the political spectrum have insisted that attempts to find peaceful solutions to
international conflicts must be given absolute priority, while military means should be employed
only as a last resort, if at all. Likewise, they have generally been skeptical about the utility of
military force and equally optimistic about the possibility of resolving conflicts through peaceful
means.135
On the other hand, these inhibitions have been counteracted by other strands in German
political culture, which have provided powerful motives for assuming a larger, if still qualified,
military role. In particular, the inherent German reluctance to participate in international military
operations has collided with the strong German commitment to multilateralism and the
concomitant rejection of ever pursuing a separate path. It has also conflicted with the imperative
to be a reliable partner. Not to join with Germany's allies and partners would smack of
unilateralism, harm its international reputation, and risk leading to isolation. In short, the norms
embedded in German political culture, which were mutually reinforcing during the cold war,
have offered contradictory prescriptions for how to respond to out-of-area crises and conflicts
since unification. As a result, and in marked contrast to the other two aspects of German policy
134
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considered above, German political leaders have consistently had to struggle to find the least
unsatisfactory compromise between opposing normative dictates.
The principal exception to Germany's record of cautious and limited responses that one
might cite consists of its efforts in late 1991 to secure the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia.136 Yet even this episode did not represent nearly as sharp a departure in German policy
as it has commonly been portrayed. Although the German government asserted itself more than
on any previous or subsequent occasion, it faced an unusually strong combination of pressures to
act, and its behavior was still marked by clear limits that were consistent with German political
culture. German leaders went to great lengths to work through multilateral channels in order to
achieve an end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, and German diplomacy toward the
conflict was equally notable for its complete lack of military backing. Subsequent to the
recognition decision, moreover, German policy assumed a much lower profile, with German
leaders regularly deferring to their Western counterparts on important issues.137
Of course, any invocation of German political culture tends to obscure the domestic
divisions that have marked the attitudes of German political elites on the out-of-area question.
Where the various strands of German political culture have come into conflict with one another,
different elite factions have hewn more strongly to one strand than another, resulting in what
Harald Müller has described as the deepest rift on a foreign policy issue since the debate over
Ostpolitik rent the Federal Republic in the early 1970s.138 As a general rule, members of the
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Union139 and Free Democratic Party (FDP) have been influenced most of all by multilateralist
sentiments and have stressed the importance of showing solidarity with Germany's allies and the
international community, assuming greater responsibility, being a reliable partner, and avoiding
Germany's isolation. Meanwhile, members of the SPD and Green party have been motivated
primary by anti-militarist convictions and thus have emphasized limiting Germany's military
role. At times, however, even the government and the parties themselves have been divided.
Yet one should not make too much of these disputes. In particular, they do not
necessarily point to the existence of distinct political subcultures. Rather, they are better
understood as the product of differences of emphasis rather than of irreconcilable positions.
Thus neither major faction has repudiated the values held most dearly by the other. Although
few if any members of the Union and the FDP have counted themselves among Germany's many
pacifists, they have by and large shared the strong postwar German aversion to reliance on the
use of force. Conversely, most members of the SPD and the Greens have been loath to see
Germany pursue a separate path. In other words, one can discern a single German political
culture that has placed distinct boundaries on the discourse employed by German political
leaders and that has clearly proscribed some theoretically possible policy responses.
Nevertheless, the installation of an SDP-Green coalition government in the fall of 1998
inevitably raised questions about the future direction of German security policy. Earlier in the
decade, the Green party had advocated German withdrawal from NATO, it had called for the
abolition of conscription and the eventually dissolution of the Bundeswehr, and it had opposed
German participation in any out-of-area military missions, including UN peacekeeping
operations. Over time, however, the official position of the party on these issues and especially
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the views of members of the pragmatic Realo wing of the party have steadily moderated.140 In
the area of national security, moreover, the coalition agreement hammered out by the two parties
clearly bore the stamp of the more centrist SPD.141 And as 1998 drew to a close, the coalition
had announced no significant policy changes. To the contrary, the new government had
expressed strong support for NATO even as it sought to reform aspects of the alliance, it had
deferred any fundamental restructuring of the Bundeswehr for at least two years, and it had
approved limited German participation in possible NATO military actions, should they become
unavoidable, in Kosovo.
Through the first months of the NATO air campaign against Serbia the following spring,
moreover, SPD and Green leaders sought to strike a careful balance between the contending
demands of multilateralism and anti-militarism. On the one hand, the government strongly
endorsed the alliance policy of using airstrikes to compel Serbia to withdraw its military and
police forces from Kosovo. On the other hand, Germany largely limited its own involvement to
the contribution of 14 aircraft intended to provide reconnaissance and to defend NATO bombers
against Serb air defenses while playing a leading role in alliance diplomatic efforts to forge a
political solution to the crisis that would involve Russia.142
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Conclusion

This brief case study offers support for the proposition that political culture can be an
important source of external state behavior. I have argued that German political elites have
shared a set of beliefs and values, or a political culture, of great relevance to national security
policy and that this political culture appears to have shaped several central aspects of German
security policy after unification. In particular, Germany's policy toward European security
institutions, its efforts to transform the Bundeswehr, and its responses to out-of-area crises and
conflicts since 1990, although often puzzling from a neorealist perspective, have been highly
consistent with the content of German political culture. More generally, this political culture has
greatly limited the country's potential for unilateral, assertive, and, especially, aggressive
behavior, placing instead a premium on continuity, stability, and restraint, even as the powerful
external constraints of the cold war era loosened. Although political culture alone cannot
account for all aspects of German security policy, it nevertheless would seem to constitute a
necessary component of any satisfactory explanation.143
In view of the impact that German political culture has had, moreover, a continuation of
German security policy along the lines laid down in the 1990s seems quite likely well into the
next century. While acknowledging the difficulty of making specific predictions, it seems safe to
say that German policy will continue to be marked by a degree of multilateralism and antimilitarism that is unusual for a country of Germany’s size and resources. In particular, one
should expect to see strong across-the-board support for European security institutions; the
preservation of conscription notwithstanding its disadvantages; no change in Germany’s limited
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capacity for independent military action; a willingness to deploy forces abroad only in
conjunction with other states, especially Germany’s NATO and EU partners, and in the presence
of an international mandate; and relatively limited levels and forms of participation in such
multilateral peace missions. Although not all of these actions would clearly disconfirm
neorealism, each would be much easier to understand in terms of Germany’s political culture
than its external environment and relative power position.
The findings of this analysis suggest, at a minimum, the value of further research into the
relationship between political culture and state behavior. I do not mean to imply that other
cultural approaches are of little or no relevance. To the contrary, they can and often must be
drawn upon in order to account for otherwise puzzling instances of state action or inaction. The
concept of global culture is potentially useful for understanding commonalities in the policies of
states of diverse sizes, locations, and levels of development. The organizational and strategic
culture approaches are well-suited for explaining certain aspects of foreign and, especially,
security policy. And yet other cultural concepts of value have been advanced. Of all the
possible cultural approaches, however, political culture applies to the broadest range of cases and
thus represents the most useful starting point for the analysis of foreign and security policy.
A logical first step in the study of political culture, given the limitations of the existing
literature, is to conduct additional case studies. Although German security policy after
unification is suggestive of the potential influence of political culture, it provides little basis for
making generalizations about its effects and its relative importance vis-á-vis other possible
external and internal sources of state behavior. As we have seen, the case of Germany since
1990 is characterized by relatively little intertemporal variation in the independent and dependent
variables. In addition, Germany is unlikely to be representative of a large number of states,
given its size, wealth, degree of involvement in the international community, unique historical
experiences, etc. Thus there is still a need for more basic evidence concerning the presence or

absence of distinct political cultures, their content, and their effects on the policies of other states
and during different historical periods. It makes little sense to engage in cross-national
comparisons of political culture until its existence and its impact have been established in
specific instances.144
As case studies cumulate, however, scholars should increasingly seek to situate their
work in an explicitly comparative framework. Such an approach is necessary to identify the
range of values that different elements of political culture may hold. At a minimum, the case of
postwar Germany suggests that significant departures can occur from a realpolitik strategic
culture that deems the use of force an effective and legitimate policy instrument.145 In addition,
comparative analysis will help to establish the nature and magnitude of the effects of political
culture, both in absolute terms and relative to other possible determinants.
Despite its potential usefulness, the concept of political culture has several important
limitations as an explanation of state behavior that must be acknowledged. Above, I noted that
not every society can be characterized as possessing a distinct political culture, that even where a
distinct political culture can be said to exist, it may offer little or no specific guidance for some
aspects of foreign and security policy, and that political culture will be of less use for explaining
specific decisions than for comprehending broad patterns and trends in policy. As a result,
political culture will best account for all aspects of a state’s behavior rarely, if ever, and
invocation of the concept will sometimes not be at all necessary.
In addition, one must bear in mind that political culture is not forever fixed. Although
often highly stable, it can evolve over time, and it can sometimes be profoundly altered in a
relatively short period, as evidenced by the transformation that arguably took place as a result of
144
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World War II in the German political culture of the first half of the 20th century. Likewise, one
should not assume that Germany’s current political culture is immune to change. To the
contrary, it is possible to imagine several scenarios in which a singularly hostile international
environment could force Germany to jettison the post-cold war policies that its elites have
preferred and, ultimately, could discredit the widely-shared beliefs and values on which those
policies have been based.146 For example, the re-emergence of an acute military threat in
combination with the loss of alliance security guarantees could prompt Germany to strengthen its
conventional forces and even to acquire nuclear weapons. External pressures of this magnitude
are, however, highly unlikely. Indeed, much of current German policy is intended precisely to
forestall the emergence of such conditions.
Nevertheless, these considerations should not obscure a more general point: although
political culture can often be treated as an independent variable in the study of state behavior,
analysts must also be attentive to possible temporal variations. Ultimately, cultural explanations
should be accompanied by a better understanding of the sources and determinants of culture
itself, just as structural theories of international relations, such as neorealism, must answer the
question of how particular international structures arise in the first place.
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Appendix: Methodological Considerations

Measuring Political Culture

The concept of political culture, although more restrictive than some cultural variables, is
still very broad. It contains a potentially large number of elements. To attempt to measure all of
them would demand substantial resources and is, in any case, unnecessary. Instead, one should
focus on those aspects of greatest relevance to the type of behavior under investigation. Of
course, just what these elements are cannot always be specified in advance, since the content of
no two cultures is exactly alike. Rather, it may be advisable in some cases to try to identify them
empirically rather than imposing an inappropriate conceptual framework.
In order to provide some guidance, however, it is useful as a general rule to begin the
process of describing political culture with a working model of its basic structure in mind, even
if this is ultimately modified or discarded. Recent research on the structure of American foreign
policy beliefs suggests one potentially useful framework with which to start. This framework
posits three particularly important dimensions along which beliefs and values regarding the
effectiveness and appropriateness of alternative policies can vary: isolationism--internationalism,
militarism--anti-militarism, and unilateralism--multilateralism.147 Because of its history,
location, and level of economic dependence, however, unified Germany has had little choice but
to be deeply engaged in international affairs. Instead, the principal policy alternatives have
concerned the nature of that involvement as well as the appropriate geographical scope (regional
or global) of Germany’s external activities. Consequently, the empirical discussion addresses
only the last two dimensions.
As for the question of where to look for culture, this analysis pays particular, although
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not exclusive, attention to the relevant beliefs and values of German political and administrative
elites. Robert Putnam has concisely defined the political elite "as those who in any society rank
toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement,
and influence in politics."148 This choice of focus offers several advantages over an analysis of
political culture in German society at large, especially as it may be revealed in public opinion.
First, elite political culture is typically easier to describe and measure comprehensively, short of
conducting public opinion polls that are sufficiently elaborate to reveal underlying attitudinal
structures. Political elites express their views frequently and often in great detail. The relative
abundance of information on elite attitudes, moreover, simplifies the task of measuring political
culture independently of behavior in order to avoid tautological reasoning.
Second, political culture as revealed in the attitudes of elites is likely to be more elaborate
and detailed. Political leaders and policy makers often have quite sophisticated and complex
political belief and value systems, which are also usually more coherent and logically consistent
than those of ordinary individuals.149 Consequently, elite political culture is more likely to
contain beliefs and values of relevance to a wide range of foreign and security issues and thus to
provide meaningful guidance for policy.
Third, as suggested by the definition of political elites, elite attitudes are likely to have a
much more immediate bearing on state behavior than will those of the general public. It is
political and administrative elites who are directly responsible for making policy, while members
of the general public often have little interest in or knowledge about policy issues. In addition,
where public opinion is clearly expressed and appears to run counter to what political leaders
prefer, they may defy it or seek to reshape it, especially in the areas of foreign and security
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policy.150
This is not meant to deny that public opinion can serve as an important constraint on or
motive force behind policy, as is suggested by the democratic peace literature, or to suggest that
elite and mass attitudes of relevance to foreign and security policy often diverge. To the
contrary, although one must be attentive to the possibility of such differences, the two are
generally consonant with one another in Germany. One reason is the leveling and
homogenization of German society that took place after World War II. As a result, most
Germans, including political elites, have undergone highly similarly processes of political
socialization. Another reason lies in postwar Germany's political institutions, including its large,
catch-all political parties and the widespread use of proportional representation. The attitudes of
German political elites are unlikely to deviate significantly for long from those of the general
public, since the electoral process tends to reward those who hold more similar attitudes, or who
at least act as though they do.151 Instead, elite views are broadly representative of those of
German society as a whole.152 The main differences are likely to lie in the complexity and
specificity of elite and mass attitudes rather than in their fundamental orientations.
Nevertheless, even an elite focus cannot eliminate -- and may even exacerbate in some
ways -- the basic methodological difficulty of describing political culture, that of "gaining
consistent, reliable access to what is inside people's minds."153 What individuals write and say
150

Page and Shapiro 1992, 172 and 283. German expert Elizabeth Pond has argued that German

elites are far more willing to disregard public opinion on important issues than are their
American counterparts (Pond 1996, 42).
151

See also Boulding 1956, 121-22.

152

Hoffmann-Lange 1991 and 1992. On the congruity of elite and mass opinion on security

issues in particular, see Schössler and Weede 1978, 74.
153

Rosen 1995, 14.

does not always accurately reflect what they actually think. Indeed, political leaders may have
more reason than most people to dissimulate or to use communications instrumentally rather than
to represent their true beliefs and values.154
Although this difficulty cannot be definitively resolved, it can be managed in various
ways. This study employs several approaches for increasing the validity of its claims about the
existence and content of German political culture. First, rather than rely on only one form of
data or another, I have sought to identify and analyze a wide range of sources of potential
relevance. In addition to surveying the available secondary literature on German security policy,
I have examined many of the public statements and writings of German political leaders and
drawn upon other available German government and political party documents and
publications.155 In this way, I have been able to ensure that my sources include the views
expressed by individuals from a range of political affiliations and before a variety of audiences.
Should regularities in these views be found where differences might be expected to appear, then
one can have greater confidence in the validity of one's inferences.156
Second, I have checked for consistency between what political elites themselves have
written and said in potentially instrumental communications and their views as described in
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relatively objective sources, such as press reports and the analyses of independent experts.157
Third, I have conducted confidential interviews with German policy makers, party officials, and
other close observers of German policy making. These subjects do not represent a random
sample of all potential interviewees within the German political and administrative elites. But
those interviewed were generally representative of the main political parties and the principal
government agencies responsible for the formulation of German security policy (Table 1).158
Although not fool-proof, the use of confidentiality, by eliciting more candid responses, should in
general yield more accurate inferences about the beliefs of interview subjects. Nevertheless, in
view of the obvious difficulties associated with the replication of interview-based findings, it
should be stressed that none of the inferences in this study are based on interview material alone.
Rather, the interviews have served primarily to corroborate information obtained from public
sources.

[Table 1 about here]

Determining the Impact of Political Culture on State Behavior

The second general task to be accomplished, that of determining the influence of German
political culture on German security policy, is complicated by the fact that this paper considers
only a single case, and then only over a relatively brief time span. As a result, there is no cross157
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Office of the Bundestag and of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation as well as the translations
contained in the daily reports of the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
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national and little temporal variation in the independent and dependent variables to provide
analytical leverage. In such situations, one can make recourse to two basic methods.159 Ideally,
one would employ what Alexander George has termed the "process-tracing" procedure, which
involves investigating and explaining the decision process or causal pathways by which various
initial conditions are translated into outcomes.160
Given space constraints, however, this paper places primary emphasis here on what
George has called the "congruence" procedure.161 By this method, one seeks simply to establish
whether a correspondence exists between the dependent variable and the types of policy
outcomes that one would logically expect to find, given the observed values of the various
independent variables under consideration. The presence of such a correspondence is a
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for establishing causality. Thus the paper attempts to
establish that several important aspects of German security policy after unification have been
inconsistent with the expectations generated, or at least not fully explained, by neorealism, while
being congruent with what consideration of German political culture would lead one to predict.
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Table 1
Interview Subjects

German Officials

Government Officials
Chancellory

3

Foreign Ministry

8

Defense Ministry

6

German Embassy, Washington, D.C. 4
German Mission to NATO, Brussels

3

Political Party Officials
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)

2

Social Democratic Party (SPD)

4

Free Democratic Party (FDP)

4

Officials in Party-affiliated Research Institutes
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU)

2

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (SPD)

2

Other Interviews

U.S. Government Officials
Department of State

2

Department of Defense

4

U.S. Embassy, Bonn

2

U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels

3

NATO Officials

5

Note: Interviews were conducted over a two-year time period spanning two trips to Germany in
1993 and 1994. Several individuals were interviewed twice.

